This paper develops a typology of different country governance contexts, in which we propose four broad categories of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Our analysis measures the most appropriate methods for helping to create a climate that is receptive to fostering corporate accountability. Our criteria are based on several different factors, none of which is determinative: the natural resources of the country; the country's dependence on one commodity; the corruption level; the stability and accountability of the government; the state of civil society; and the existence of ongoing conflict.
Introduction
The country governance context is critical in deciding on appropriate strategies to improve corporate responsibility. This paper develops a typology of different governance contexts, in which we propose four broad categories of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
At one end of the spectrum are countries with economies and governments that are so poorly managed that there is little multinational investment -sometimes even in the context of lucrative investment opportunities. At the other end lie those countries with acceptable levels of good governance, more developed economies and markets, and with, consequently, a comparatively high level of both domestic and multinational corporate investment. We examine the appropriateness of strategies to apply external or internal pressure in different types of countries. Next, we discuss the affects of applying the proposed intervention strategies to the countries, addressing both short and long-term expected results. The first category of countries, which includes the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, is, in the context of this topic, the least well understood; therefore, the paper discusses in greater detail the case of one of these, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereafter "DRC").
Typology
Various entities have developed different means for measuring a country's growth and eligibility for investment. The World Bank uses criteria to assess a country's eligibility for IDA (International Development Assistance) that focus on per capita income and creditworthiness for borrowing from both commercial and multilateral institutions and appropriate performance standards, such as macroeconomic stability and good governance.
2 These criteria are weighed together; for example, a country with a lower per capita income than the IDA cut-off may nonetheless be ineligible if it is able to secure commercial and other multilateral loans. 3 Although the World Bank uses this classification for eligibility for loans, grants, and special programs of debt relief, other institutions also rely on these classifications. 4 In sub-Saharan Africa, there are 37
countries that qualify for IDA-status. 5
The World Economic Forum uses a growth competitiveness index based on the quality of the macroeconomic environment, the state of the country's public institutions, While these measures are useful for background information, in our analysis, we are measuring a country's suitability not just for the stability of economic investment nor eligibility for development assistance. Instead, we are examining the most appropriate methods for helping to create a climate that is receptive to fostering corporate accountability, a complex analysis that includes legal, social, economic, and political variables. Our criteria are based on several different factors, none of which is determinative: the natural resources of the country; the country's dependence on one commodity; the corruption level; the stability and accountability of the government; the state of civil society; and the existence of ongoing conflict. Examining these factors together results in measuring not just the country's receptivity to change, but also the means for producing change.
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We have divided countries in sub-Saharan Africa into four different categories. 10 We call the first category of countries "Category 0," to denote the near-absence of both effective governance and significant levels of foreign investment. These countries, such as Burundi, the DRC, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, have long had weak, highly corrupt governments, typically have suffered recently from war, and are left today with very low levels of international investment. Category 0 countries possess extremely ineffective basic institutions in the areas necessary to establish the prerequisites for corporate controls of any kind; they lack a reliable legal system, governmental transparency, and functioning capital markets. 11 The law as written and the law as enforced in the courts differ dramatically. 12 Ironically, many of these countries are resource-rich, but they do not perform as well as some resource-poor countries when it comes to economic, social, and governance issues. 13 A recent Global Witness report notes: "Instability, coupled with widespread corruption throughout the DRC, is currently a major deterrent to foreign investment . . . Understandably, many mining companies are unwilling to take the risks involved in starting operations in the DRC." 14 As a result, notwithstanding the many opportunities for business investment, there is little external capital, and indigenous businesses remain relatively small.
10 Although our analysis focuses on sub-Saharan Africa, the categories can be used more globally as well.
11. Id. at 848. The last sentence of the article concludes "[t]hese countries need honest judges and regulators, good disclosure rules, and the beginnings of a culture of honesty before it makes sense to worry" about other corporate governance issues, such as the number of independent directors. Id. at 849.
12. This is certainly true in the Congo. Stuart Cohn, Teaching in a Developing Country: Mistakes Made and Lessons Learned in Uganda, 48 J. Leg. Educ. 101, 104 (1998). In preparing to teach a course on securities markets in Uganda, Professor Cohn discovered that "[n]othing existed except the laws, a Capital Markets Authority that had no capital markets to regulate, and a stock exchange devoid of stock." Id. at 104. His advice to other teachers developing similar courses is not to assume that their students know the law. In Uganda, for example, copies of relevant statutes were simply not available in the numbers necessary for teaching in the classroom. Id. at 108.
13. Id. at 1.
14 Global Witness at 8. 22. See Kaufmann, supra n. 44, at 19 (in countries with "high levels of transparency, effective parliamentary oversight, and high standards of corporate ethics, there was a higher rate of GDP growth over the previous three years than in countries with lower standards of transparency, of parliamentary oversight, and corporate ethics"). Other developmental outcomes, such as the literacy rate and infant mortality, are also positively affected. Id. at 17. Category 3, the final category, includes the best-run countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, such as South Africa, Ghana, Mali, and Senegal. In these countries, country governance is much improved and orders of magnitude better than in Category 0 countries, economies are diversified, and levels of foreign investment are already reasonably high. South Africa, for example, had the highest amount of manufacturing exports in sub-Saharan Africa, with an annual growth rate of 7-8%. 24 Corporate Accountability and Good Governance
The central implications of the typology are that countries in different categories require different strategies relating to corporate responsibility. A deeper implication is that the entire strategic approach to corporate responsibility requires unpacking. For example, it is hard to enhance corporate responsibility in countries with no multinational corporations! Should those countries in Category 0, then, be put in a category labeled "hopeless"? How can you have corporate accountability and responsibility in a situation where there are few corporations and very weak governance? Is the relationship between corporations and good governance really as insidious as some still assume?
We believe it is a bias to assume that increased international investment by corporations is in and of itself a bad thing for the country or that corporations prefer poor governance. In the context of Category 0 countries, these statements are patently untrue.
The existence of a substantial multinational presence could provide the impetus for change. On the other hand, outside of a few countries where extractive industries provide such great rewards that they justify the risks (as seen in many category 1 countries), widespread corruption and inefficient government serve as a disincentive to foreign 24 Africa Development Indicators, supra note __, at 104-105.
investment. 25 When corporations cannot rely on enforcement of contracts, cannot rely on public bureaucracies, cannot hire literate workers, then they are much less likely to invest in a country.
There has been a great deal of publicity and activism around issues of "economic globalization," a phenomenon which Jagdish Bhagwati thoughtfully describes as "integration of national economies into the international economy through trade, direct foreign investment . . . short-term capital flows, international flows of worker and humanity generally, and flows of technology." 26 Economic globalization is accused of benefiting multinational corporations over local workers, and increasing the wealth of foreign investors at the expense of country-internal workers and businesses. 27 In a thoughtful paper, Todd Moss and his colleagues discuss the historical antipathy towards foreign investment in Africa, and debunk many of the myths. 28 While we too recognize the dangers of globalization, we also believe that foreign investment can improve a country's economic, political, and social outlook.
Indeed, it is only within the past decade that international economists have begun to study the relationship between good governance and a good business environment. 29 New research shows that good governance results in improved development, but that increasing incomes does not, by itself, result in good governance. In an exhaustive survey of the relationship between governance and corruption, World Bank economists used six concepts to measure good governance, including governmental accountability, political stability, and the quality of government service delivery, consisting of policy making, the rule of law, and corruption control. 31 The Bank economists found a correlation between good governance and per capita income, but they also discovered that a higher per capita income does not necessarily result in better country governance. 32 On the other hand, good governance is critical to fostering sustainable development. 33 When executives were asked to list the most important constraints on their firms' growth, corruption and ineffective government bureaucracies were second and third on the list, with only a lack of finance rated as a larger constraint. 45. Le Billon, supra n. 3, at 257-258; Swanson, supra n. 149, at 62, 79. In its preliminary review of the Angolan diamond certification process, the NGO Global Witness suggests the necessity of independent monitoring performed by an unaffiliated entity to protect the integrity of any control system. Global Witness, Can Controls Work? A Review of the Angolan Diamond Control System?, http://www.globalwitness.org; select diamonds, select briefing documents, select English version 'can controls work' (Dec. 26, 2001 ). See also Gereffi et al., supra n. 6, at 60 (pointing out that control systems vary in strength depending on whether they are sponsored by industry, NGOs, or multilaterals).
follow-up monitoring throughout the duration of its projects. 46 These outside control efforts are important, and work should be done to make sure that the laws as they stand are enforced, and that greater openness is supported.
To sustain the corporate responsibility agenda, however, local communities must feel vested in the process. As the World Bank points out, only when "public sector actors and stakeholders based in developing countries are accorded a central role" can "an agenda that remains largely 'foreign'" become domestic. 47 The most critical reforms are those that increase political participation and accountability and promote competitive economic develop, but such democratization and economic development do not occur quickly. 48 Category 0
Multinational corporations do not want to work in Category 0 countries. In a recent study of 107 multinational companies with total revenues of $1.66 trillion, respondents were asked about the impact of corporate social responsibility on their investment decisions. 49 A majority of the respondents noted that the influence of corporate social responsibility considerations had increased over the past five years, and that such concerns had at least as much impact as more traditional considerations -such as cost -on the decision to undertake new business opportunities. 50 Moreover, a majority of the extractive industry (mining and oil and gas companies) respondents reported that they had decided not to begin operations in a new country based on such recommending that twenty-nine companies be subjected to financial restrictions, including a freezing of assets and a suspension of banking activities. In another recent report on the mineral trade in copper and cobalt in the DRC, Global Witness documents the conditions under which these minerals are collected in the southernmost region of the Congo amid widespread corruption and mismanagement.
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For example, under the new Mining Code, companies are required to pay a 1% tax; one company reported that it was asked to pay this so often that it became a 40% tax. The record suggests that "advancing liberty," and other worthy goals, is a much more difficult undertaking. The proposed interventions are not bad, they are insufficient.
Certain actions, such as reforming the judiciary, in countries like the DRC are long-term and extremely difficult. Furthermore, implementing these long-term reforms depends on a well-paid civil service, and these essential longer-term strategies will fail if civil servants are not paid enough. Category 0 countries need additional investment. For Category 0, attacks on multinationals tend to miss the point. As we have already noted, these companies, in the main, are not even present in countries like the DRC. We will return to this issue at the conclusion of this paper. There is, of course, a perceived, and often real, conflict of interest between the objectives of multinationals, their host and home governments, the multilaterals, the communities, and the NGOs. Each has its own goals, and in many sub-Saharan African governments individuals working in the public sector have their own selfish interests in receiving payments outside of the official system.
Unlike Category 0 countries, where we believe combined local and international strategies must be intertwined to gain improvements in basic country governance, in Category 1 and beyond a variety of more loosely linked strategies, including work to improve corporate governance, can be effectively employed. As the ongoing oil bribery investigations in Nigeria illustrate, external legislation, such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, may at least punish irresponsible corporate actions, even if it does not 63. Le Billon, supra n. 3. 64. This is not to overlook the role that such institutions play in countries with effective governments and low rates of corruption; however, there is literature addressing these issues already. Supra n. 9. entirely deter such actions. 65 We do not, however, believe that external actors and actions should ever be delinked from the realities of the targeted country and society. People within the country must always be part of any process that looks to enhance governance and corporate responsibility.
Categories 2 and 3
Category 2 and 3 countries should benefit from approaches similar to those in As an example of how increasing literacy can reduce corruption, consider the status of education in Uganda. In a survey examining the use of public funds in education in Uganda, researchers found that between 1991 and 1995 only 13 percent of the federal government's allocation for non-wage expenditures actually reached the schools. Instead, most of the money was being diverted to local government officials (and other politicians). After the survey information was disseminated publicly, the government instituted a series of reforms, including publishing the monthly grants to each primary school in newspapers for all to see and posting school grants awards on the school wall. Because of the increased information, parents were better able to monitor how local officials used public funds. 71 As a result, the amount of leakage diminished substantially: by 1999, over 80 percent of allocated fund reached the schools. 72 The study concluded that information dissemination is important in reducing corruption. 73 This, of course, is the concept of transparency. It works best when there is a literate population.
Transparency works as a sealant against the corrosiveness of corruption.
Corruption takes a series of different forms, including bribes to obtain government services (corruption in administration), as well as corruption in the process of promulgating rules (corruption in law-making). 74 Although corruption in law-making is significant in preventing change in a country's governance structure and in maintaining the dominance of the existing elite, bribing government officials to obtain precious government access is the largest area of corruption in developing countries. 75 Because businesses need access to obtain export permits or business licenses, they may feel coerced into bribing the appropriate official. 76 Additionally, in many developing countries where civil service positions are poorly (if at all) compensated jobs, government employees may feel justified in accepting bribes for their services. 77 While the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention, together with other programs, attempt to prevent corruption and bribery, 78 they are not effective in many countries. 79 Civil servants also must receive adequate salaries on time. Particularly in Category 0, 1, and 2 countries, poorly-trained, ill-paid, unmotivated civil servants stuck in an inefficient, overstuffed public sector impede efforts towards improved governance.
Efforts around the margins in countries where this overriding problem is not addressed are destined to be ineffective. Building a civil service system based on impartiality and transparency, where public employees depend on the state rather than the illegal payments of private companies for their salaries, creates a better business environment and provides reassurance to civil society actors.
Conclusion
Actions to improve good governance can be taken in all categories of countries.
But actions to improve corporate responsibility are poorly targeted when focused on Category 0 countries. Our proposed typology leads us to suggest that Category 0 countries require a radically different approach than those in Category 1. People interested in more justice and improvements in human well-being through improved corporate governance, should focus on the approaches discussed above in Category 0 countries. When successful, these approaches will lead to greater involvement of international business, which should be a positive development, under the scenario outlined in this paper.
More traditional approaches, such as external pressure through a variety of means on multinational businesses, can have a positive effect in Category 1-3 countries.
Category 1 countries seem the most ripe for targeted efforts by international actors to obtain improvements in local conditions through enhanced multinational corporate responsibility. While Categories 2 and 3 will also improve through such efforts, and the pressure must be sustained, they are already, in general, far more receptive to both domestic and international efforts to promote corporate accountability, and such efforts have already begun to yield encouraging results.
